My research is primarily in social epistemology. I am interested in investigating the ways in which institutions and communities influence our grasp of epistemological concepts, i.e., justification, evidence, truth. Recently, I have been especially interested in how non-conscious beliefs can be passively adopted through cultural and social practices and their use and normative status after adoption. Since this question presents itself in several areas of contemporary analytic philosophy, I also have strong familiarity with associated areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I also emphasize interaction with contemporary social psychology and cognitive science in my approach.

A full research statement is available here.

Publications

Larson, Maddox. (2025). “Responsibility to reflect: Reflection as epistemic responsibility in democracy.” The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review 4: 5-14. Available here.

Abstract. In this article, I argue that responsible knowers are responsive to critical feedback that their reasons for believing in a given proposition or using certain principles of reasoning are inadequate. The project of democracy expects that agents can provide reasons for their beliefs during testimonial exchange. Voters provide reasons to representatives. Representatives provide reasons to voters. Voters provide reasons to each other. And representatives provide reasons to each other. This means that when voters or representatives cannot provide reasons, democratic mechanisms are obstructed. However, not all beliefs are adopted autonomously through reflection, but rather by social-institutional context. I argue, then, that responsible agents reflect on the reasons for their belief when their reasons are inadequate. They are attuned to the nature of expertise and evaluate expert testimony with this in mind. In full, democracy requires that agents hold beliefs autonomously and be cognizant of the nature of expertise.

Larson, Maddox. (2024). “Epistemic vulnerability and tolerance in society.” The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review 3: 15-28. Available here.

Abstract. The question of church-state separation has haunted America since her founding. James Madison and select founding fathers suggest that religions and states are better off when they minimize (or altogether eliminate) their interactions. Many Muslims in Iran, for instance, believe the opposite – aligning state functions with religious motives results in the most effective state. In this paper, I propose a model of thinking about church-state separation in which states and religions must maintain epistemic vulnerability to allow legal, political, and socio-religious change. Simply put, epistemic vulnerability is an attitude of susceptibility to new sources and instances of knowledge. I present institutions as sets of constraints which interact with shared mental models. In this way, I explain how cultural institutions limit and shape individuals’ susceptibility to new knowledge. The more accommodating a religion is to self-assessment when confronted with new knowledge aids in forming institutions that are reliable, efficient, and robust for groups to grow and adopt new ideas. This results in a model of state-religion that highlights the impact on epistemic vulnerability when either religious organizations or state governance expand their responsibilities outside of their proper functions.

Graham, Kevin M., Anaja Arthur, Ali Griswold, Beau Kearns, Quinlyn Klade, Maddox Larson, and Suraya Wayne. (2023). “Black trust and white allies: Insights from slave narratives.” Social Philosophy Today 39: 183-195. Available here.

Abstract. In this article, we explore two related questions. First, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a society founded on racial slavery? Second, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a white supremacist society? We follow Karen Jones and Nancy Nyquist Potter in arguing that allies must not only be competent, conscientious, and accurately self-assess their epistemic capacities, but they must also signal their trustworthiness in advance to those who would trust them. Furthermore, we argue based on our readings of the slave narratives of Mary Prince, Harriet Jacobs, and Frederick Douglass that allies must display social awareness of the social context that they share with those who would trust them and the power dynamics involved in that social context.