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Presented at 2022 Midwest Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April 2022
Presented at 2023 Midwest Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April 2023
Published in Social Philosophy Today, 2023
In this article, we explore two related questions. First, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a society founded on racial slavery? Second, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a white supremacist society?
Recommended citation: Graham, Kevin M., Anaja Arthur, Ali Griswold, Beau Kearns, Quinlyn Klade, Maddox Larson, and Suraya Wayne. (2023). "Black trust and white allies: Insights from slave narratives." Social Philosophy Today. 39: 183-195.
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Published in The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review, 2024
In this paper, I propose a model of thinking about church-state separation in which states and religions must maintain epistemic vulnerability to allow legal, political, and socio-religious change. Simply put, epistemic vulnerability is an attitude of susceptibility to new sources and instances of knowledge. I present institutions as sets of constraints which interact with shared mental models. In this way, I explain how cultural institutions limit and shape individuals’ susceptibility to new knowledge.
Recommended citation: Larson, Maddox. (2024). "Epistemic vulnerability and tolerance in society." The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review. 3: 15-28.
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Presented at 12th Mid-Hudson Valley Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April 2024
Published in The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review, 2025
In this article, I argue that responsible knowers are responsive to critical feedback that their reasons for believing in a given proposition or using certain principles of reasoning are inadequate. The project of democracy expects that agents can provide reasons for their beliefs during testimonial exchange. Voters provide reasons to representatives. Representatives provide reasons to voters. Voters provide reasons to each other. And representatives provide reasons to each other. This means that when voters or representatives cannot provide reasons, democratic mechanisms are obstructed. However, not all beliefs are adopted autonomously through reflection, but rather by social-institutional context. I argue, then, that responsible agents reflect on the reasons for their belief when their reasons are inadequate. They are attuned to the nature of expertise and evaluate expert testimony with this in mind. In full, democracy requires that agents hold beliefs autonomously and be cognizant of the nature of expertise.
Recommended citation: Larson, Maddox. (2024). "Responsibility to Reflect: Reflection as Epistemic Responsibility in Democracy." The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review. 4: 5-14.
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With K.M. Graham, D. Snider, and M. Spigner. |
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With A.C. Ozar and M. King. |
Undergraduate course, Creighton University, 2023
During the 2023-24 academic year, I served as the Teaching Assistant (“Decurion”) to Professor Todd Salzman, PhD, for the Introduction to the Culture of Collegiate Life (RSP101) course.